Categories
COVID-19

The Curious Case of Sweden

Diners in Stockholm during the COVID-19 pandemic. Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP via Getty Images

Sweden’s approach to COVID-19 is different from most countries. Is it working there? Should the US have adopted this strategy? A closer look at the Swedish experience reveals significant problems with the Scandinavian country’s approach and highlights inherent differences between the two countries that largely prohibit its application in the US.

Facing a novel Coronavirus with a doubling time of around 2 days, most of the world reacted to SARS-CoV-2 with what can only be described as justifiably draconian measures to slow the spread. Absent mitigation and with a doubling time of 2 days, the US would have seen the virus hit every American within about 40 days. America, like most of the world, enacted emergent stay-at-home and social distancing orders and closed non-essential businesses to flatten the curve. Too many infections too quickly would have completely overwhelmed the healthcare system, tragically demonstrated in Wuhan and Lombardy where the virus had a devastating head-start.

Several prominent European countries undertook a different strategy. England, the Netherlands and Sweden instituted what is considered a herd-immunity approach. While it’s important to note that England and the Netherlands had to abandon this blueprint when cases and deaths started climbing, Sweden has largely stuck with the plan. The idea behind this is that in the absence of a vaccine, the only way to move on from a virus like this is to allow herd-immunity to develop. The purest form of this approach would be to just let the virus burn through a population and allow everyone to become infected, but at the cost of thousands of lives and an overwhelmed healthcare system. Sweden didn’t go that far but instead attempted to find a middle-ground. They executed a much less restrictive approach than other nations and allowed businesses, restaurants, bars, and gyms to to stay open while enacting certain social distancing rules for the owners and patrons to follow. The Swedish government, instead of stay-at-home orders, recommended that Swedes voluntarily enact social distancing by working from home and keeping an arm’s length distance when around others. It’s somewhat like a controlled burn approach with the goal of keeping the virus down to about 30% of its normal spread while focusing on the protection of vulnerable populations.

On the surface, Sweden’s approach seems to be working for them. Without enacting strict, often unpopular laws, Sweden has effectively flattened the curve and prevented a hospital crisis. The government believes that in Stockholm at least, a significant portion of the population has been infected and that they may be closing in on herd immunity but this is a projection without solid data confirmation as comprehensive serology testing has not yet been fully undertaken. Results in Sweden have led some here in the United States to suggest that Sweden is evidence that the response to COVID-19 has been an overreaction to a virus that is not as severe as experts would have us think and that Sweden’s strategy should have been adopted here to soften the economic blow.

Let’s take a look at the Swedish experience to see whether these claims have merit and whether they could have been successfully adopted in the US.

First I think it’s important to determine whether their approach is as different as it seems. While there’s no stay-at-home order in Sweden, there are public health orders in place to increase social distancing. High schools and colleges were closed, gatherings of over 50 people are prohibited, in restaurants and bars, patrons must maintain arm’s length distance from one another. Instead of orders, Sweden called on its citizens to voluntarily enact social distancing principles. The population was asked to work from home, avoid unnecessary travel and maintain distance from others. Swedes seem to have largely adopted these measures. Data suggests that movement in the streets of Stockholm was down to 30 percent of normal, a number that in many cases surpasses US reductions in movement even in the regions most compliant with mandated stay-at-home orders. Upwards of 50% of Swedes transitioned to working from home and use of public transit dropped in half as well. Even vacations have been canceled with 85% of Swedes reporting that they would not be taking the usual annual pilgrimage to the resort island of Gotland.

Whether mandated or not, a voluntary stay-at-home policy is still a stay-at-home measure. Swedish ideology is rooted in a deep respect for social justice. Heba Habib at the Christian Science Monitor who has followed the Swedish experience with COVID-19 reports that Swedes take great pride in their personal responsibility. The idea of breaking the social contract of social distancing by holding a mass gathering or flocking to the beach at the first sign of sun would be flatly rejected by Swedes.

Sweden promotes itself as being a model society based on values of social justice and human rationality, with a high level of trust between people and trustworthy authorities. This has its origins from the Social Democrat-introduced concept of “Folkhemmet,” or people’s home, where a welfare state cares for all with the proviso that everyone complies with a communal order.

Heba Habib/Christian Science Monitor

In effect, Swedes largely trust their authorities to do what’s best for the people with respect to COVID-19 and in return they have generally complied with voluntary COVID-19 orders when asked to do so by their government. The Swedish experience with COVID-19 has been reliant on this trust in government and the importance of maintaining the social contract. Though falling somewhat in recent years, the OECD index on government trust shows Swedes trust their government quite a bit more than Americans do. For the Swedish approach to work in the US, Americans would have to show the same willingness to take the governments assessment of virus severity and subsequent social-distancing recommendations as truth and follow them without legal mandate to do so. Americans suggesting that Sweden’s approach should be ours, must honestly answer if it is part of US national identity to trust and comply with government in this way.

Trust in government: Sweden–56%, US–35%/OECD

So has the Swedish approach worked? If the only metric by which you measure success is flattening the curve to prevent overwhelming hospitals, then yes, Sweden has succeeded for now. It’s possible that Stockholm has peaked though data is not yet conclusive and it is too early to tell if the nation has peaked. Youyang Gu’s universally praised, highly predictive model estimates an overall infection rate of about 5% in Sweden; that is nowhere near numbers needed for herd immunity. It would seem there are still a lot of people left for the virus to burn through.

What about their deaths? Have they protected the people from dying, particularly the vulnerable? If this is the metric of success, then Sweden’s approach has not been particularly successful. Deaths in Sweden are proportionately higher than their Scandinavian neighbors who enacted stricter social distancing measures.

Total deaths and Deaths/Million People/John’s Hopkins

These deaths have hit vulnerable populations in Sweden hard. About 50% of all deaths in Sweden have occurred in elder care facilities. One of the goals of the Swedish approach was to protect these vulnerable populations; in that they have not been particularly successful. If your metric for measuring success is preventing death, particularly among the vulnerable, then Sweden has come up short.

One of the arguments made here in American by people opposed to the social distancing orders is the effect these measures have on the economy. They point to Sweden as an example of a country that has been able to keep its economy open in spite of COVID-19. If we take a closer look at their economy, however, Sweden is not fully escaping the toll this virus has taken on other nations with more aggressive lockdowns. The Swedish Finance Minister projected that the economy would shrink by 7% which was a worsening of previous projections. This contraction is similar to the projected contraction in the Netherlands and depending on how the virus behaves, could be as much as 10%. Unemployment is expected to reach 11%. That’s certainly better than the US’s expected 20-30% unemployment. It’s important to remember, however, that the Swedish government helps to prevent unemployment by giving employers money to keep people on payroll. To compensate for reduced employee hours and business productivity losses, employers are permitted to cut salaries but the government then supplements employee pay up to 90% of original salary. The US has attempted to pass legislation that similarly protects jobs by providing forgivable loans to businesses who keep people on the payroll. The roll-out has been fraught with problems and the money quickly dried up before most could benefit. Businesses have had to let people go while waiting for assistance, driving up unemployment rates. The US focus has been to provide one-time payments to most Americans and to bolster the unemployment benefits system. Sweden’s very different approach is of course paid for in part through a very different taxation strategy than in the US. The top statutory personal income tax rate in Sweden in 2018 was 57% and applies to all earners who are making 1.5 times the national average and in the US, the top rate of 43.7% applies only to people who make over 9 times the national average. I bring this up not to advocate for a Swedish welfare state or for the US to adopt the Swedish system of taxation. It is, however, important to consider the apples to oranges differences in Swedish and US economic strategies when suggesting that adopting the Swedish approach to COVID-19 would work in America or that we would see the same economic benefits.

There are other factors which make the Swedish experience somewhat unique and difficult to apply elswhere. Their population density is significantly lower and they have far less travel into the country than their harder hit neighbors in Europe. Inbound tourism is dwarfed by countries like Spain, Italy and France and the US. According to the World Tourism Organization, in 2017, Sweden had 7M inbound tourists compared with almost 77M inbound tourist to the US. With fewer people traveling into the country, Sweden was able to avoid massive importation of the virus making their initial contact tracing efforts exponentially easier to manage.

So this has all been a long-winded way of saying that Sweden’s approach is not the panacea some in the United States claim. In fact, 22 of Sweden’s top research and infectious disease scientists recently wrote an op-ed in a national newspaper calling on the government to enact strict social-distancing and stay-at-home orders matching other nations. They’re concerned about Sweden’s high number of deaths and continuing increases in new daily cases, especially in vulnerable populations. As they see it, Sweden is headed for a disastrous surge in cases which could soon overwhelm their healthcare system.

I can’t say that Sweden has been completely wrong-headed about their approach. It’s simply too early to tell. The world should study their model and learn from it to see if it ultimately demonstrates a benefit. A comprehensive review of all the factors that contribute to a nation’s success or failure in the fight against COVID-19 is far beyond the scope of this blog post and, frankly, beyond the knowledge of its author. My goal here is to simply point out that fundamental differences in our two countries make for difficult comparisons and tougher still, conclusions. The idea that the Swedish experience proves the public health response in the US was an overreaction to an overhyped virus is unsupported by the facts. It’s also folly to suggest that the Swedish model, not yet shown to be successful even in Sweden, would work in America. The differences between our two countries both physically and temperamentally are vast. Ignoring these fundamental differences and assuming that the Swedish approach to COVID-19 would be successful if adopted here is woefully naive even if politically expedient.

Time will tell if the Swedes have successfully ridden the wave of COVID-19 into herd immunity without the need for government orders, or if all they’ve done is push their peak down the road a bit and that dark days lie ahead for them.

Categories
COVID-19

On Bitter Pills

“The cure can’t be worse than the disease.”

This is a common and somewhat understandable refrain in recent months. Is the damage to the economy caused by public health interventions like social distancing and shelter-in-place worse than the potential damage of COVID-19 itself? Is the cure worse than the disease? How can we know?

“The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.”

Winston Churchill

History can help us if we’re willing to learn from it. Several economists have taken a bite out of this problem with very interesting results. Prof. Emil Verner from the MIT Sloan School of Management along with Dr. Sergio Correia and Dr. Stephan Luck from the Federal Reserve have done what more of us should do–learn from history. Together these economists studied social distancing practices or non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) from the Spanish Flu of 1918 to evaluate the effects of social distancing on the economy. Their paper is not yet peer-reviewed but it provides some compelling insights into the efficacy of public health interventions in a pandemic and the resulting economic impacts.

The 1918 influenza pandemic is thought to have infected nearly a third of the world’s population at the time or 500 million people. In the United States alone, 675,000 people died, worldwide–50 million. It was caused by an H1N1 virus with genes of avian origin. Public health measures at the time were focused on prevention of spread from person to person. Those infected were prevented from breathing the same air as the uninfected. Public health guidelines and interventions at the time included prohibiting mass gatherings, banning non-essential meetings, closing dance halls, bars and cinemas, and some encouraged staggered work times to prevent unnecessary congregation. All pretty familiar stuff today, right? Like today, the degree to which these recommendations were followed varied widely throughout the country.

Policemen in Seattle wearing masks during the 1918 Influenza pandemic/National Archives

What Verner, Correia and Luck found was that, as expected, higher mortality in a region led to greater economic depression. More than that though, they looked at American Cities’ response and compared the economic impact of municipalities who enacted strict social distancing measures with those who enacted much weaker measures. Here they found that cities who enacted the strictest social distancing measures had lower mortality but they also experienced the greatest economic growth. Simply put, cities that were committed to public health measures like social distancing had fewer deaths and better economic outcomes.

The green-dot cities in the upper left who enacted strict NPIs like social distancing over longer periods had lower mortality and higher economic growth whereas the red-dot cities in the lower right, who were more lenient with NPIs, experienced higher mortality and stunted economic growth. The authors say it best.

Comparing cities by the speed and aggressiveness of NPIs, we find that early and forceful NPIs do not worsen the economic downturn. On the contrary, cities that intervened earlier and more aggressively experience a relative increase in manufacturing employment, manufacturing output, and bank assets in 1919, after the end of the pandemic.

Emil Verner, Dr. Sergio Correia and Dr. Stephan Luck/Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu

The economic impacts of this pandemic on families and businesses has been devastating. Public health measures like shelter-in-place and social distancing are a bitter pill to be sure. History tells us, however, that this medicine, while hard to swallow, gives us the best chance of surviving, both medically and economically.

Future generations will study this moment, perhaps as they face their own crisis. Just like us they’ll be looking for clues from the past about how to survive. Will they see ancestors rooted in solid science with an unwavering commitment to public health, or will they see a fleeing from science and reason when things got hard? I’m not sure.

In the end, history will judge.

Categories
COVID-19

What The Bakersfield Doctors Got Horribly Wrong

Alex Horvath/The Californian

A week ago Drs. Dan Erickson and Artin Massihi shared data from their regional urgent cares that seemed to indicate that SARS-CoV-2 had spread much further in their region than testing would indicate and that it was therefore much less dangerous than thought. They went so far as to say that the stay-at-home order is unnecessary and that people should get back to work.

“Do we need to still shelter in place? Our answer is no. Do we need businesses to be shut down? No. Do we need to test them and get them back to work? Yes we do,”

Dr. Dan Erickson.

The best critique I’ve seen of their study came from Dr. Carl T. Bergstrom, a University of Washington biologist who specializes in infectious disease modeling. Here’s a transcript of his response with a link to the actual series of tweets below.

“What they did was simple: they looked at the fraction of patients who tested positive for COVID-19 at the clinics they own. They found 340 out of 5213 tests were positive, about 6.6.%. They assume the same fraction of the whole population are infected. From there, they scale up to the state level and claim 12% incidence statewide. The news story says it is using the same calculation, but it can’t be–how did they get from 6.6% to 12%? Perhaps they estimating [sic] infected *ever* versus infected *currently*. It is not clear.

Using that 12% infected figure, and a known 1400 deaths in California, they assume 1400 out of 4.7 million have died. That gives them an infection fatality rate of 0.03%. That is they think that if 10,000 are infected, 3 will die on average. The problem with this approach is that during a pandemic, the people who come into an urgent care clinic are not a random sample of the population. A large fraction of them are coming in precisely because they suspect that they have the disease.

This generates sampling bias.

Estimating that fraction infected from patients at an urgent care facility is a bit like estimating the average height of Americans from the players on an NBA court. It’s not a random sample, and it gives a highly biased estimate.

Moreover the estimate does not pass even a basic plausibility check. In New York City, 12,067 people are known to have died from the virus, out of a population of 8.4 million. This is a rate of 0.14% of all people. Not just infected people. All people. That gives us a lower bound on the death rate in New York. Not an estimate, a lower bound. The death rate for infected people is obviously higher than 0.14% because not everyone in New York has been infected. And yet that 0.14% lower bound is nearly *five times as high* as the 0.03% that the Bakerfield [sic] duo are claiming. They’ve used absurd methodology to arrive at an implausible number.

If the pandemic were not so severely politicized, this would be a non-issue from the start.

Dr. Carl T. Bergstrom

Bergstrom tweet

The docs from Bakersfield made a common statistical error by not studying a random sample of the population. If you’re going to use sample data to draw conclusions about the total population, you’d better make sure your sample is representative of the total population. It’s easy to get wrong even if you’re trying hard to get it right. Had they utilized a tool (e.g. random digit dialing) to find representative members of their community and schedule that random sample of people for testing they’d have come a lot closer to creating an actual study. Instead, they injected an almost humorous level of bias into their study by choosing a sample certain to have a higher infection rate than the total population–quite a bit higher as they’re coming into an urgent care, you know, sick.

The American College of Emergency Physicians and the American Academy of Emergency Medicine weren’t laughing however when they issued a joint statement on the matter.

The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) and the American Academy of Emergency Medicine (AAEM) jointly and emphatically condemn the recent opinions released by Dr. Daniel Erickson and Dr. Artin Massihi. These reckless and untested musings do not speak for medical societies and are inconsistent with current science and epidemiology regarding COVID-19. As owners of local urgent care clinics, it appears these two individuals are releasing biased, non-peer reviewed data to advance their personal financial interests without regard for the public’s health.

COVID-19 misinformation is widespread and dangerous. Members of ACEP and AAEM are first-hand witnesses to the human toll that COVID-19 is taking on our communities. ACEP and AAEM strongly advise against using any statements of Drs. Erickson and Massihi as a basis for policy and decision making.

AAEP/AAEM Joint Statement on Physician Misinformation

I’m going to give these two docs the benefit of the doubt and assume that they just made a huge mistake for which they are embarrassed. I’m going to assume that they weren’t actually trying to put their own financial wellbeing ahead of the public’s health. I’m going to assume they did not have a political agenda when crafting this mess of a study.

I think it’s important for my own peace of mind that I do that.